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The work of this thesis is motivated by the open problem whether the Axiom of
Determinacy implies every set of reals is Ramsey.
First, we reduce the open problem to a problem for sets with some certain property.
Consider [ω]ω as the whole set of reals. For two reals x, y, define x ∼ y if ∃k ∈ ω,
x\k = y\k. Define a set of reals A to be invariant if A is a union of some equivalence
classes of∼. We proposed the weakly Ramsey property, which is a connection between
the Ramsey property and invariant sets. By some analysis on the behavior of weakly
Ramsey sets, it is proved in this thesis that if every invariant set is Ramsey then
every set is Ramsey in the context of ZF +DC + AD.
Second, It is reasonable to run an induction on the Wadge rank. And we did
some investigation into the Wadge rank of invariant sets. It is summarized by Theo-
rem 4.2.3.
With the help of these two results, the induction proof for invariant sets with




The work reported in this thesis is focused on the Ramsey property. The history
of Ramsey property starts with an interesting phenomenon. Consider a party with
at least six people. Some people are mutually acquaintances if each one knows the
others, and are mutual strangers if each one does not know either of the others. Then
the conclusion is that at least three people are either mutual strangers or mutually
acquaintances.
Now consider a theoretical extension of this phenomenon. Suppose there are
infinitely and countably many people in this party. Then the conclusion is that there
are also infinitely and countably many people who are all either mutual strangers or
mutually acquaintances.
In set theory, we usually use ω to denote the whole set of natural numbers and
[H]2 to denote the set of ordered pairs {(m,n)| m ∈ H,n ∈ H and m < n} for H an
infinite subset of natural numbers. Then the phenomenon in the previous paragraph
can be translated as: for every set A ⊆ [ω]2 there is some H an infinite subset of
2ω such that either [H]2 ⊆ A or [H]2 ∩ A = ∅. Ramsey [17] extended this result to
arbitrary finite exponent by induction on the exponent.
One may want to generalize this property to the infinite case. To be precise,
for infinite subset of natural numbers H, let [H]ω denote the set of infinite strictly
increasing sequences {< n0, n1, n2, ... > | n0 < n1 < ... and ∀i ∈ ω, ni ∈ H}. Then
the question is whether for every A ⊆ [ω]ω there is some H an infinite subset of ω
such that either [H]ω ⊆ A or [H]ω ∩ A = ∅. A set A is called to be Ramsey if the
answer to this question is “Yes”
In set theory, infinite subsets of natural numbers and infinite strictly increasing
sequences of natural numbers are always considered the same, as they can code each
other. Moreover, they are both used to denote real numbers. Hence, the Ramsey
property is a property of sets of reals. Then the natural question is:
Does every set of reals satisfy this property?
The answer to this question is “No” due to Erdo˝s and Rado [6]. They constructed
a set without the Ramsey property by using the axiom of choice. Since the axiom of
choice is equivalent to that every set can be wellordered, there is a wellorder on the
set of all reals. Suppose < xα| α < c > is an enumeration of all reals where c is the
continuum. The idea is to enumerate one element of [xα]
ω into a candidate A and
another element into a candidate B by induction on α, requiring that all reals having
been already enumerated into A or B are not affected by later steps. Then neither A
nor B is Ramsey. Hence the question turned to be:
What kind of sets satisfy the Ramsey property?
In the first step to attack this problem, Galvin and Prikry [9] proved that every
3Borel set is Ramsey. Silver [20] generalized this result to that every analytic set1 is
Ramsey, and in the same paper, Silver proved that every Σ˜12 set2 is Ramsey provided
that there is a measurable cardinal3. Mathias developed a forcing notion (known as
the Mathias forcing) to investigate the consistency strength of the Ramsey property
(see Chapter 2.2 of this thesis). Mathias [12] proved that every set of reals is Ramsey
in Solovay’s model [21]. Based on the Mathias forcing, Ellentuck [5] introduced a
new topology (see Chapter 2.1 of this thesis) on sets of reals, and proved that a set
of reals is Ramsey if and only if it has the Baire property in his topology. In 1990s,
Feng, Magidor and Woodin [7] improved Silver’s results by proving that every Σ˜12
set is Ramsey under the existence of 0]4, which is weaker than the existence of a
measurable cardinal.
From these results, we can see that the original question has been changed grad-
ually. Researchers were no longer interested in just proving certain kind of sets are
Ramsey. Instead, they became more satisfied in the relationship between large cardi-
nal hypotheses and the scope of Ramsey sets. The reason is that it is meaningless to
argue what kind of sets are Ramsey without setting the axiomatic system in advance.
Generally, to prove sets with higher complexity are Ramsey, stronger axiomatic sys-
tems would be needed. Then one may ask the following question:
What axiomatic system can guarantee that all sets of reals are Ramsey?
1Consider ωω as the product topology starting with the discrete topology on ω. Then a subset
of ωω is analytic if it is a continuous image of the whole space ωω. Here we do not distinguish ωω
and [ω]ω since they can code each other.
2A set of reals A is Σ˜12 if there is some B such that the complement of B is analytic andx ∈ A⇔ ∃y(x, y) ∈ B where (, ) codes two reals into one real naturally. Σ˜12 sets are more complicated
than analytic sets.
3A cardinal κ is measurable if there is a measure on the powerset of κ (see Chapter 10 of [10]).
40] is the set of true formulae about indiscernibles of the constructible universe, provided the
class of indiscernibles is suitable enough (see Chapter 18 of [10]). The existence of a measurable
cardinal implies the existence of 0].
4Motivated by this question, Prikry [16] first connected the Ramsey property with
determinacy. The axiom of determinacy (AD) is a statement that for every game
on natural numbers, one of the players has a winning strategy (see Chapter 2.3 of
this thesis). Prikry [16] proved that ADR is sufficient to guarantee that every set is
Ramsey where ADR
5 is stronger than AD. A natural candidate to replace ADR is
AD. This yields the ultimate problem.
The Ultimate Open Problem: Does AD imply that every set of reals is Ram-
sey?
A positive answer to this problem is partially supported by Martin and Steel.
They [11] proved that every set is Ramsey assuming AD and V = L(R)6. Years
later, Woodin proposed AD+ and proved an unpublished result that AD+ implies
that every set is Ramsey. AD+ is an axiom stronger than AD while weaker than
ADR [24]. Moreover, Woodin conjectured that AD and AD
+ are equivalent. So the
answer to the ultimate open problem is likely to be positive. However, this problem
has been left open for many years.
Here is another reason why this problem is interesting. Ramsey property has al-
ways been considered as one of the four regular properties of sets of reals. The other
three properties are Lebesgue measurability, Baire property7 and perfect tree prop-
erty8. In the context of ZFC, it is easy to construct sets of reals without Ramsey
5ADR asserts that for every game on real numbers, one of the players has a winning strategy.
6L(R) is defined to be the collection of sets constructible where all real number and the whole
set of reals can be used as parameters. Moreover, it is the smallest inner model of ZFC containing
the whole set of reals R( [10], chapter 13).
7A set has the Baire property if the symmetric difference between this set and some open set is
meager.
8A set has the perfect tree property is equivalent to that it has a perfect subset.
5property, Lebesgue measurability, Baire property and perfect tree property, respec-
tively. Meanwhile, in the context of ZF +AD +DC (DC stands for the Dependent
Choice), every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable, and has Baire property and per-
fect tree property (see Chapter 33 of [10]). So it is reasonable to conjecture that the
situation is the same for the Ramsey property. But it is not known whether every set
of reals is Ramsey in the context of ZF + AD +DC.
The aim of this thesis was to find some axiom which is very close to AD and
strong enough to imply that every set is Ramsey. In other words, we are not satisfied
with the result that AD+ implies every set is Ramsey. There is still gap between
AD and AD+, so we want to find some axiom in between. Such an axiom was found
after lots of work. As indicated before, AD+ implies that every set is Ramsey. Hence
it also implies that every invariant set of reals is Ramsey (the definition of invariant
set will be provided in the next section). The main result of this thesis is that the
statement “every invariant set is Ramsey” is strong enough to give a positive answer
to the ultimate open problem:
Theorem 1.1.1. (Theorem 3.2.3)(ZF+AD+DC) Suppose every invariant set of reals
is Ramsey. Then every set of reals is Ramsey.
Now the only thing left to solve the ultimate open problem is to check whether AD
implies that every invariant set is Ramsey. A partial result of this was also achieved
by this thesis. The original idea is to prove that every invariant set is Ramsey by
induction on the Wadge rank. We summarized our investigation on the Wadge rank
of invariant sets:
Theorem 1.1.2. (Theorem 4.2.3) Assume ZF + DC + AD. Let A in an invariant
set. Then the Wadge rank o(A) of A does not satisfy any of the following.
6• o(A) is a successor ordinal;
• o(A) has cofinality ω;
• o(A) = α + ω1 for some ordinal α.
In summary, this thesis gives a new approximate answer to the ultimate open
problem. By Theorem 3.2.3 and Theorem 4.2.3, this open problem is reduced to the
behavior of invariant sets with certain Wadge orders, which is easier to investigate
compared with the investigation into all sets of reals.
In chapter 2, we introduce the Ellentuck topology [5], and review the proof that
every open set in this topology is completely Ramsey. The concept of completely
Ramsey was also proposed by Galvin and Prikry [9]. After this we introduce the
Mathias forcing, which is closely related to the Ellentuck’s proof. This forcing notion
is very useful in the later chapters. We end chapter 2 with some analysis of the axiom
of determinacy, together with some consequences.
In chapter 3, we first introduce a weaker version of the Ramsey property, and
then prove that every set has this weak property in the context of AD, using some
applications of the Mathias forcing. Then we prove Theorem 3.2.3 with this finding.
In chapter 4, we introduce the Wadge rank and some of its basic properties. Then
we do some analysis of the behavior of invariant sets with different types of Wadge
ranks. With the help of this analysis, we prove Theorem 4.2.3.
71.2 Conventions
In set theory, a positive natural number n refers to the collection of smaller natural
numbers. The set of all natural numbers is always denoted by the Greek letter ω.
The natural order < on ω is a wellorder. A wellorder on some specific set is a linear
order on this set such that every nonempty subset of this specific set has a minimal
element with respect to this linear order.
A real number refers to an infinite subset of ω. As there is a natural wellorder
< on ω, we also use a strictly increasing sequence of natural numbers with infinite
length to represent a real. Let A be an infinite subset of ω. We use [A]ω to denote
the collection of all infinite subsets of A and [A]<ω to denote the collection of all finite
subsets of A. So [ω]ω is the whole set of reals.
Let s be a finite subset of ω and x be an infinite subset of ω. Then s is also a finite
strictly increasing sequence of natural numbers, and x is an infinite strictly increasing
sequence of natural numbers. x − s refers to the set {n ∈ x|n > max(s)}. We use
s < x to denote the statement that max(s) < min(x). And if s < x, we use sˆ x to
denote the infinite set s∪x. Moreover, assuming pi is a map from [ω]ω to some natural
number, pi/(s, x) is defined to be the map pi∗ as pi∗(z) = pi(sˆ < x(z(i))| i ∈ ω >). In
this definition, the two reals x and z are considered as two sequences. Also for a set
of reals A, the notion A/(s, x) denotes the set {z ∈ [ω]ω| sˆ < x(z(i))| i ∈ ω >∈ A}.
For a set of reals D and some s ∈ [ω]<ω, let Ds denote the set {x ∈ [ω]ω| sˆ x ∈ D}.
The whole set of reals [ω]ω is always considered as a topological space. The usual
topology on this space is the Baire space, where the basic open sets are in the form
of Ns = {x| s ≺ x} for some s ∈ [ω]<ω. Here s ≺ x means that s is an initial segment
of x. When talking about the topological space [ω]ω, we are referring to the Baire
8space unless additional statements are made.
To define the invariant set, we first define a relation on reals. For two reals x and
y, we say x ∼ y if there is some k ∈ ω such that i ∈ x if and only if i ∈ y for all i > k.
In other words, x ∼ y if x and y are the same module some finite part. It is easy to
see that this relation ∼ is an equivalence relation. A set of reals is invariant if it is a
union of some equivalence classes of ∼.
Let A be a subset of ωω, where ωω is the collection of maps from ω to ω. Con-
sider the following game GA associated to A, played by two players. There are ω
many rounds in this game. In the k−th round, player I plays a natural number nk
first, and then player II plays some natural number mk. Finally, player I wins if
< n0,m0, n1,m1, ..., nk,mk, ... >∈ A. Otherwise player II wins.
A strategy for this game is a map from ω<ω to ω. We say a player follows the
strategy σ if this player plays σ(s) whenever this player gets into the position to play
and s is the sequence of natural numbers having been played so far. Then a strategy
is a winning strategy for some player if this player always wins following this strategy.
A game is determined if one of the players has a winning strategy in this game.
The axiom of determinacy(AD) is the statement that for every A ⊆ ωω, the game GA
is determined. ADR is an analogue statement of AD, where the only difference from
AD is that in the involved games, each player in each round plays a real instead of a
natural number.
Generally, there is no much difference between ωω and [ω]ω. In some context,
elements in ωω are also considered as real numbers. In this thesis, elements in [ω]ω
are used to represent real numbers because it is more convenient to describe the
Ramsey property.
9In most cases of this thesis, lowercase letters i, j and k are used to denote natural
numbers, s, t and r are used to denote finite sequences of natural numbers, and x, y
and z are used to denote reals. Uppercase letters are usually used to denote infinite
subsets of natural numbers and subsets of reals, dependent on the context. Greek
letters σ and τ are also used to denote reals and strategies.
For a set A, P(A) is used to denote the powerset of A. For two sets A and B,
A \B is used to denote the set {x ∈ A| x 6∈ B}.
A set A is transitive if x ⊆ A for all x ∈ A. Similarly, a model M is transitive
if x ⊆ M for all x ∈ M . Moreover a model M is an inner model of ZFC if M is a
transitive model of ZFC containing all ordinals.
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Chapter 2
Mathias Forcing and Determinacy
In this chapter, we introduce the Ellentuck topology [5], and review the result that
every open set in this topology is completely Ramsey. The idea of this proof is
essentially due to Galvin and Prikry [9], who also proposed the concept of completely
Ramsey. In fact, Ellentuck [5] proved that every set has the Baire property in the
Ellentuck topology if and only if it is completely Ramsey. But for this study, the
result for open sets is sufficient. After this we introduce the Mathias forcing, which is
closely related to the Ellentuck’s proof, and plays a very important role in the further
part of this thesis.
In the rest part of this chapter, we give a brief introduction to the axiom of de-
terminacy (AD), and review some useful consequences to AD. Then we do some
analysis of the Mathias forcing defined in some inner model of ZFC with the as-
sumption that V |= AD. With this analysis in hand, we review that AD+ implies
every set is Ramsey, where AD+ is an extension of AD, proposed by Woodin.
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2.1 Ellentuck Topology
Definition 2.1.1. Let A be a subset of [ω]ω. A is Ramsey if there is some x ∈ [ω]ω,
such that either [x]ω ⊆ A or [x]ω ∩ A = ∅. Such x is called a homogeneous set for A.
In some sense, a set of reals is Ramsey if it contains or is disjoint from some
alternative version of the whole set of reals [ω]ω.
Definition 2.1.2. For s ∈ [ω]<ω and A ∈ [ω]ω with s < A, let
[s, A]ω = {x ∈ [ω]ω| s ≺ x ∧ x \ s ⊆ A}.
Then the Ellentuck topology on [ω]ω has all basic open sets the sets in the form of
[s, A]ω where s ∈ [ω]<ω and A ∈ [ω]ω with s < A.
Remark 2.1.1. As indicated in the introduction chapter, the natural topology on [ω]ω
is the Baire space where each basic open set is correspondence to a sequence of natural
numbers with finite length. Hence there are only countably many basic open sets in
the Baire space and they can be coded by natural numbers. The situation is quite
different in the Ellentuck topology. By the definition of the Ellentuck topology, each
basic open set is actually a real number. So the collection of natural numbers is not
large enough to code all basic open sets in the Ellentuck topology.
In fact, each basic open set in the Ellentuck topology is actually a copy of the
whole space [ω]ω. Every set concentrating on this copy can be coded by a set in
the whole space. Recall the notion U/(s, A) from the introduction chapter. The set
U/(s, A) codes all information of U concentrating on [s, A]ω. This yields the concept
of completely Ramsey property.
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Definition 2.1.3. Let D be a subset of [ω]ω. D is completely Ramsey if ∀s ∈ [ω]<ω
and A ∈ [ω]ω with s < A, there is some B ∈ [ω]ω, such that B ⊆ A and either
[s, B]ω ⊆ D or [s, B]ω ∩D = ∅.
Informally speaking, a set of reals is completely Ramsey if it is Ramsey relative
to every basic open set in the Ellentuck topology.
Theorem 2.1.1 (Galvin and Prikry [9]). Every open set in the Ellentuck topology is
completely Ramsey.
Proof. Let U be an arbitrary open set in the Ellentuck topology. To simplify the
notions, we first prove that U is Ramsey.
For t ∈ [ω]<ω and B ∈ [ω]ω, we say B accepts t if [t, B− t]ω ⊆ U , and B rejects t
if ∀E ⊆ B, E does not accept t. It is straitforward to get the following properties
from this definition:
(∗) If B does not reject t, then B has a subset which accepts t;
(∗∗) If B accepts (or rejects) some t, then every infinite subset of B accepts (or
rejects) t.
We assume that for every B ∈ [ω]ω, [B]ω 6⊆ U , as otherwise B witnesses that U
is Ramsey. In other words, we assume that ω rejects ∅. We want to construct a real
such that each finite subset of it is either accepted or rejected by this real. This aim
is achieved by enumerating new elements into the target set by induction.
Now let B0 be ω and k0 be min(B0) = 0. Suppose {Bi| 0 ≤ i ≤ n} and {ki| 0 ≤
i ≤ n} have been defined with the following properties:
• ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n, ki = min(Bi);
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• ∀0 ≤ i < n,∀t ⊆ {kj| 0 ≤ j ≤ i}, Bi+1 either accepts t or rejects t.
We need to construct set Bn+1 with the similar property. To be precise, Bn+1
must be a subset of Bn and each subset of {ki| 0 ≤ i ≤ n} must be either accepted
or rejected by Bn+1.
Let < tm| 0 ≤ m < 2n+1 > be an enumeration of P({ki| 0 ≤ i ≤ n}). By the
property (∗), there is some B<n+1,0> ⊆ Bn such that B<n+1,0> either accepts t0 or
rejects t0. Then there is some B<n+1,1> ⊆ B<n+1,0> such that B<n+1,1> either accepts
t1 or rejects t1. And so forth. After 2
n+1 many steps, we can find a ⊆-descending
sequence < B<n+1,m>| 0 ≤ m < 2n+1 >, such that ∀0 ≤ m < 2n+1, B<n+1,m> either
accepts tm or rejects tm. Let Bn+1 be B<n+1,2n+1−1> and kn+1 be min(Bn+1). Then
for any t ⊆ {ki| 0 ≤ i ≤ n}, t = tm for some m < 2n+1. Then by our construction,
B<n+1,m> either accepts t or rejects t. Since Bn+1 = B<n+1,2n+1−1> ⊆ B<n+1,m>, Bn+1
accepts or rejects t because of the property (∗∗).
By induction on the index i, we have these two infinite sequences {Bi| i ∈ ω} and
{ki| i ∈ ω} with the following properties:
• ∀i ∈ ω, ki = min(Bi);
• ∀i ∈ ω,∀t ⊆ {kj| 0 ≤ j ≤ i}, Bi+1 either accepts t or rejects t.
Let E be the set {ki| i ∈ ω}. Then ∀t ∈ [E]<ω, there is least i ∈ ω such that
t ⊆ {kj| 0 ≤ j ≤ i}. In fact, this i is determined by max(t) = ki. Hence Bi+1 either
accepts t or rejects t. Moreover, E − t ⊆ {kj| i < j} ⊆ Bi+1. Therefore, E either
accepts t or rejects t by the property (∗∗). Generally,
(∗ ∗ ∗) ∀t ∈ [E]<ω, E either accepts t or rejects t.
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This interesting E is not good enough, since there are still two possibilities for
each of its finite subset. It would be great if some real can universally accept or reject
all its finite subsets. Fortunately, such a real can be constructed by shrinking E step
by step under some proper assumption. We need the next claim towards this end.
Claim 2.1.2. Suppose E rejects some t ∈ [E]<ω, then the set {n ∈ E| E accepts tˆ n}
is finite.
Proof. Suppose this statement is false. Let t ∈ [E]<ω be a witness that E rejects
t and that the set {n ∈ E| E accepts tˆ n} is infinite. Let E∗ be this infinite set
{n ∈ E| E accepts tˆ n}. Then E∗ ⊆ E. Since E rejects t, by the definition, E∗ does
not accept t. Hence [t, E∗ − t]ω 6⊆ U . So there is some x ∈ [t, E∗ − t]ω \ U . Assume
that tˆ n ≺ x. Then n ∈ E∗ since x− t ⊆ E∗. By the definition of E∗, E accepts tˆ n.
Hence [tˆ n, E− tˆ n]ω ⊆ U . Since tˆ n ≺ x and x\t ⊆ E∗ ⊆ E, x ∈ [tˆ n, E− tˆ n]ω. Then
x ∈ [tˆ n, E− tˆ n]ω ⊆ U . But by the choice of x, x 6∈ U . So we get a contradiction.
Since we have assumed that [B]ω 6⊆ U for every B ∈ [ω]ω, so E rejects ∅. By
Claim 2.1.2, the set {n ∈ E| E accepts < n >} is finite. Let l0 ∈ E be an upper
bound of this finite set. Then ∀n ∈ E, n ≥ l0 implies that E does not accept < n >.
In particular, E does not accept < l0 >. Then E must reject l0 because of the
property (∗ ∗ ∗). So E rejects ∅ and t. In other words, ∀t ⊆ {l0}, E rejects t.
Suppose < li| 0 ≤ i ≤ n > has been defined with the following property:
∀t ⊆ {li| 0 ≤ i ≤ n}, E rejecets t.
Then by Claim 2.1.2, for each t ⊆ {li| 0 ≤ i ≤ n}, the set {n ∈ E| E accepts tˆ n}
is finite. Since the power set of < li| 0 ≤ i ≤ n > is also finite, there is some ln+1 ∈ E
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such that ∀t ⊆ {li| 0 ≤ i ≤ n},∀m ∈ E,m ≥ ln implies that E does not accept tˆ n
and ln+1 > ln.
Now we check that E rejects t for all t ⊆ {li| 0 ≤ i ≤ n+1}. First by the induction
hypothesis, E rejects t for all t ⊆ {li| 0 ≤ i ≤ n}. Second, let t ⊆ {li| 0 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1}
end with ln+1. Assume that t = r lˆn+1 for some r ⊆ {li| 0 ≤ i ≤ n}. Then by the
chosen of ln+1, E does not accept r lˆn+1. By the property (∗∗∗), E must reject r lˆn+1.
So E rejects t for all t ⊆ {li| 0 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1}.
Finally we get a strictly increasing sequence < li| i ∈ ω > such that ∀t ∈ [< li| i ∈
ω >]<ω, E rejects t. Now let B be the set {li| i ∈ ω}. Then B ⊆ E and ∀t ∈ [B]<ω,
E rejects t. So B rejects t for all t ∈ [B]<ω because of the property (∗∗).
Now it suffices to show that [B]ω ∩ U = ∅. To derive a contradiction, we assume
that [B]ω ∩ U 6= ∅. Then [B]ω ∩ U is a nonempty open set. Pick some x ∈ [B]ω ∩ U .
Then there is some basic open set [t,W ]ω such that x ∈ [t,W ]ω ⊆ [B]ω ∩ U . Hence
t ∈ [B]<ω and W ⊆ B. So B rejects t. But this contradicts that [t,W ]ω ⊆ U . So
[B]ω ∩ U = ∅. Therefore, U is Ramsey.
The aim is actually to prove that U is completely Ramsey. In other words, we have
to prove that U is Ramsey relative to every basic open set in the Ellentuck topology.
Since each basic open set is just a copy of the whole space, the proof given above also
works for this case. To be precise, let [s, A]ω be a basic open set and consider this
basic open set as a subspace of [ω]ω. Then U/(s, A) is Ramsey since it is open in the
Ellentuck topology. So U is Ramsey relative to [s, A]ω. Therefore, U is completely
Ramsey.
By this theorem, an open set in the Ellentuck topology is Ramsey relative to
every basic open set. However, there is still uncertainty because the Ramsey property
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involves two cases. Nevertheless, such uncertainty can be eliminated for some special
open sets.
Corollary 2.1.3. Let D be an open dense set. Then for every basic open set [s, A]ω,
there is some B ⊆ A, such that [s, B]ω ⊆ D.
Proof. Fix D, s and A as in the corollary. By Theorem 2.1.1, D is completely Ramsey.
In other words, there is some B ⊆ A, such that [s, B]ω ⊆ D or [s, B]ω ∩D = ∅. But
[s, B]ω ∩D cannot be empty since D is dense. So [s, B]ω ⊆ D.
By this corollary, open dense sets are not only Ramsey in each basic open sets,
but uniformly fall into the same case. The importance of this uniform property shows
up in the next section.
2.2 Mathias Forcing
Forcing was first introduced by Paul Cohen [1] [2] [3], aiming to prove the indepen-
dence of the Axiom of Choice from ZF and of the Continuum Hypothesis from ZFC.
Following an observation of Solovay, Scott [18] formulated the Boolean-valued ver-
sion of Cohen’s method. A similar result was also achieved by Vopeˇnka [22]. So far,
numerous models and consistent results have been achieved by forcing.
The canonical process of forcing is adding some new set (a generic set) into a small
transitive model (the ground model) to get a larger transitive model (the generic
extension). A forcing notion is a set in the ground model with a partial order (both
the set and the order must be in the ground model). Elements in this partially
ordered set are called conditions which are used to approximate the generic set. The
theory of the generic extension is determined by the ground model and the generic
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set. So the generic extension may be a model of some novel property if the forcing
notion is well chosen. Therefore, forcing has been used to construct new models and
to investigate the consistency strength of certain statements. Due to this significant
function, forcing has been promoting the development of set theory greatly and now
become a fundamental tool in set theory.
Here we list some definitions and properties of forcing notion which are useful in
this thesis(see Chapter 14 of [10]).
Definition 2.2.1. Let M be a transitive model of ZFC, and P = (P,≤) be a forcing
notion in M . Let D ∈M be a subset of P . Then D is open if ∀p ∈ D ∀q < p (q ∈ D);
D is dense if ∀p ∈ P ∃q ∈ D (q ≤ p).
Definition 2.2.2. Let M be a transitive model of ZFC, and P = (P,≤) be a forcing
notion in M . A set of conditions G is a generic set over M if
• G is not empty;
• if p ≤ q and p ∈ G, then q ∈ G;
• if p, q ∈ G, then there exists r ∈ G such that r ≤ p and r ≤ q;
• if D ∈M is a dense subset of P , then G ∩D 6= ∅.
A set of conditions G satisfying the first three requirements is called a filter. The
model extended by G is denoted by M [G].
In fact, the fourth requirement in this definition can be replaced by the require-
ment that D ∈M is a dense open subset of P , then G ∩D 6= ∅.
Let ϕ be a sentence of the forcing language, and p be a condition. p is defined to
decide ϕ if p  ϕ or p  ¬ϕ. Here are several basic properties.
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• M [G] |= ϕ if and only if p  ϕ for some p ∈ G where G is a generic set.
• For every p, there is a q ≤ p such that q decides ϕ.
• p  ϕ if and only if no q ≤ p forces ¬ϕ.
Recall that for every subset of ω, we identify it with its characteristic function.
The idea of the Ellentuck topology is based on the Mathias forcing. In fact, the basic
open sets in the Ellentuck topology are exactly the conditions of the Mathias forcing.
Definition 2.2.3 (Mathias Forcing). A condition is a pair (s, A), where s ∈ [ω]<ω,
A ∈ [ω]ω, and s < A. A condition (s, A) is stronger than a condition (t, B) ((s, A) ≤
(t, B)) if
• t is an initial segment of s;
• s ∪ A ⊆ t ∪B.
From the aspect of the Ellentuck topology, a condition (s, A) is stronger than a
condition (t, B) if the basic open set [s, A]ω is a subset of the basic open set [t, B]ω.
As discussed before, each basic open set is actually a real, hence a strictly increasing
sequence of natural numbers. So for smaller basic open set, longer initial segment
of the coding real is fixed. Therefore, more information of the generic extension is
determined if we choose this coding real to approximate the generic set. This is why
smaller basic open sets are defined to be stronger.
Now consider a Mathias forcing P = (P,≤) in a transitive model M of ZFC. In
M , each subset of P codes a set of reals. The coding method is natural. Let D ∈M
be a subset of P . Then let D∗ be the set {[s, A]ω| (s, A) ∈ D}. D∗ is automatically
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open in the Ellentuck topology. Moreover, D∗ is dense provided that D is dense. This
correspondence together with the results in the previous section yields the following:
Proposition 2.2.1 (Prikry condition [15]). Let M be a transitive model of ZFC, and
P = (P,≤) be the Mathias forcing in M . Let ϕ be a sentence of the forcing language,
and (s, A) be a condition. Then there is some B ⊆ A such that (s, B) decides ϕ.
Proof. Work in M . Fix some ϕ and a condition (s, A).
Let S0 = {p ∈ P | p  ϕ} and S1 = {p ∈ P | p  ¬ϕ}. Since for every p, there is a
q ≤ p such that q decides ϕ, the union S0 ∪ S1 is a dense subset of P .
Let D0 =
⋃{[t,W ]ω| (t,W ) ∈ S0} and D1 = ⋃{[t,W ]ω| (t,W ) ∈ S1}. Then D0
and D1 are two open sets in the Ellentuck topology. Moreover, D0∪D1 is open dense
since S0 ∪ S1 is dense in P . Then by Corollary 2.1.3, there is some E ⊆ A, such that
[s, E]ω ⊆ D0 ∪D1. By Theorem 2.1.1, every open set is completely Ramsey. So there
is some B ⊆ E, such that [s, B]ω ⊆ D0 or [s, B]ω
⋂
D0 = ∅.
Case 1. [s, B]ω ⊆ D0.
It is sufficient to prove that (s, B)  ϕ. To derive a contradiction, we assume that
(s, B) 6 ϕ. Then there is some (t,W ) stronger than (s, B) such that (t,W )  ¬ϕ.
(t,W ) ≤ (s, B) implies that t ∪W ∈ [s, B]ω ⊆ D0. By the definition of D0, there is
some (r,Q) ∈ S0, such that t∪W ∈ [r,Q]ω. So t ≺ r or r ≺ t and t∪W ⊆ r∪Q. This
implies that (t ∪ r,W ∩Q) is stronger than both (r,Q) and (t,W ). But (t,W )  ¬ϕ
and (r,Q)  ϕ. So (t ∪ r,W ∩Q) forces both ϕ and ¬ϕ. This is a contradiction. So
(s, B)  ϕ.
Case 2. [s, B]ω ∩D0 = ∅.
In this case, since [s, B]ω ⊆ [s, E]ω ⊆ D0 ∪D1, [s, B]ω ⊆ D1. Then by an argument
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analogue to case 1, we get that (s, B)  ¬ϕ. In summary, (s, B)  ϕ or (s, B)  ¬ϕ.
So (s, B) decides ϕ.
In the description of forcing method, the generic set is a very important set.
Normally, the ground model is fixed when some specific forcing notion is concerned.
Then the theory of the generic extension is totally determined by the chosen of the
generic set. Now we introduce some analysis of the generic sets of the Mathias forcing.
For G a P−generic set over M , let xG be the set
xG = ∪{s ∈ [ω]<ω| ∃A, (s, A) ∈ G}.
Such xG is called a P−generic real or a Mathias real over M . Moreover, there is an
one-one correspondence between generic sets and generic reals.
Lemma 2.2.2. Let G be a P−generic set over M , and xG be the corresponding
generic real. Let G′ be the set {(s, A) ∈ P| xG ∈ [s, A]ω}. Then G = G′.
Proof. We first prove that G is a subset of G′.
Suppose G is not a subset of G′. Let (s, A) be in G \ G′. Then s ≺ xG. Since
(s, A) 6∈ G′, xG 6∈ [s, A]ω. Let t be an initial segment of xG such that t − s 6∈ [A]<ω.
By the definition of xG, we can choose some special t such that there is some W such
that (t,W ) ∈ G. Since G is generic, there is a condition (r,Q) which is stronger than
both (s, A) and (t,W ). Then r must extend t and r − s ∈ [A]<ω. This contradicts
the fact that t− s 6∈ [A]<ω. So G is a subset of G′.
Now it suffices to prove that G′ is a generic set. It is quite straightforward to
check that G′ is a filter. Let D ∈M be an open dense set. Then G ∩D 6= ∅ since G
is generic. So G′ ∩D 6= ∅ since G ⊆ G′. Hence G′ is P− generic over M .
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So a real x is a Mathias real if the set {(s, A) ∈ P| x ∈ [s, A]ω} is a generic
set. Moreover, the converse is also true. Suppose the set G = {(s, A) ∈ P| z ∈
[s, A]ω} is generic for some real z. It is sufficient to check that z = xG = ∪{s ∈
[ω]<ω| ∃A, (s, A) ∈ G}. Suppose z 6= xG. Then there is an s ∈ [ω]<ω such that
∃A(s, A) ∈ G and ¬(s ≺ z). But (s, A) ∈ G implies that z ∈ [s, A]ω. This contradicts
that ¬(s ≺ z). So z = xG.
Now one may wonder whether Mathias reals exist or not. Generally, the answer to
this question depends on the strength of the axiomatic system. Nevertheless, Mathias
gave a characterization of such generic reals.
Definition 2.2.4. For A,B ∈ [ω]ω, A and B are almost disjoint if A ∩ B is finite.
A ⊆ [ω]ω is a almost disjoint family if ∀A,B ∈ A, A and B are either almost disjoint
or the same set. An almost disjoint family A is a maximal almost disjoint (m.a.d.)
family if there is no almost disjoint family B such that A is a proper subset of B.
Proposition 2.2.3 (Mathias property [12]). In V , a real x is P−generic over M if
and only if for every maximal almost disjoint family A in M , there is some X ∈ A
such that x \X is finite.
Proof. For one direction, we fix a Mathias real x, and a maximal disjoint family
A ∈ M , and prove that ∃X ∈ A such that x \ X is finite. Let D be the set
{(s, A \ s)| s ∈ [ω]<ω, A ∈ A} and Dˆ be the set {p ∈ P | ∃q ∈ D, p ≤ q}. Then D and
Dˆ are both in M .
Now we verify that Dˆ is dense in P . Pick some (t,W ) ∈ P. Since A is a maximal
almost disjoint family, there is some A ∈ A such that W ∩ A is infinite. Let B be
W ∩A, then (t, B − t) is stronger than both (t, A− t) and (t,W ). So (t, B − t) ∈ Dˆ.
Hence Dˆ is dense.
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Let Gx be the set {(s, A) ∈ P| x ∈ [s, A]ω}. Then Gx is generic since x is a
Mathias real. So Gx ∩ Dˆ 6= ∅ since Dˆ is dense. Let (r,Q) be in Gx ∩ Dˆ. Then by the
definition of Dˆ, there is some (s, A) ∈ D such that (r,Q) is stronger than (s, A). So
Q ⊆ A. Also, since (r,Q) ∈ Gx, we get that x ∈ [r,Q]ω. So x \ Q ⊆ r. Hence x \ Q
is finite. So is x \ A.
For the other direction, we fix an open dense set D and a real x such that for
every maximal almost disjoint family A, there is some X ∈ A with x \X finite. The
aim is to prove that x is a Mathias real. Let Gx = {(s, A) ∈ P | x ∈ [s, A]ω}. Then it
suffices to show that Gx ∩ D 6= ∅. For s ∈ [ω]<ω and X ∈ [ω]ω with s < X, we say
X captures (s,D) if ∀Y ∈ [X]ω, there is some t such that t is an initial segment of Y
and (sˆ t, X − t) ∈ D.
Claim 2.2.4. In M , ∀A ∈ [ω]ω∀s ∈ [ω]<ω,∃B ⊆ A, such that B captures (s,D).
Proof. Work in M .
Let A ∈ [ω]ω and s ∈ [ω]<ω such that s < A. We construct two sequences
< Ai| i ∈ ω > and < ki| i ∈ ω > by induction. Let A0 be a subset of A such that
(s, A0) ∈ D if such subset exists. And let A0 = A otherwise. Then let k0 = min(A0).
Suppose < Ai| 0 ≤ i ≤ n > and < ki| 0 ≤ i ≤ n > have been defined. Let < tj| 0 ≤
j < 2n+1 > be an enumeration of [< ki| 0 ≤ i ≤ n >]<ω. Let A<n+1,0> be a subset
of An such that (sˆ t0, A<n+1,0>) ∈ D if such subset exists, and let A<n+1,0> = An
otherwise. For 0 < j < 2n+1, let A<n+1,j> be a subset of A<n+1,j−1> such that
(sˆ t, A<n+1,j>) ∈ D if such a subset exists, and let A<n+1,j> = A<n+1,j−1> otherwise.
Then let An+1 = A<n+1,2n+1−1> and kn+1 = min(An+1). Finally let X = {ki| i ∈ ω}.
Let D∗ = {[t,W ]ω| (t,W ) ∈ D}. Then D∗ is open dense in the Ellentuck topology
since D is dense in P . By Corollary 2.1.3, there is some B ⊆ X, such that [s, B]ω ⊆
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D∗. We check that B captures (s,D).
Let E be an infinite subset of B. Then s ∪ E ∈ [s, B]ω ⊆ D∗. So there is some
(t,W ) ∈ D such that s ∪ E ∈ [t,W ]ω. Since D is dense open, we can assume that
s ≺ t. Let t∗ = t \ s. Then t∗ is an initial segment of E, and (t, E − t∗) is stronger
than (t,W ). So (t, E − t∗) ∈ D since D is open. Assume that min(E − t∗) = km.
Then E − t∗ ⊆ Am.
Case 1. t∗ = ∅.
Then (s, E) ∈ D since s = t. By the definition of A0, (s, A0) ∈ D. Since D is dense
and B ⊆ X ⊆ A0, (s, B) ∈ D. In other words, (sˆ t∗, B − t∗) ∈ D.
Case 2. t∗ 6= ∅.
Then assume that max(t∗) = kl. Since min(E) = km, so l < m. Hence t∗ ∈ [<
ki| 0 ≤ j ≤ l >]<ω. Since (sˆ t∗, E) ∈ D and E − t∗ ⊆ Al+1, by the definition of Al+1,
(sˆ t∗, Al+1) ∈ D. So (sˆ t∗, B − t∗) ∈ D since B − t∗ ⊆ Al+1 and D is open.
So in both cases, (sˆ t∗, B − t∗) ∈ D. Hence B captures (s,D).
Claim 2.2.5. In M , ∀A ∈ [ω]ω, there is some B ⊆ A such that ∀s ∈ [ω]<ω,max(s) ∈
B ⇒ B − s captures (s,D).
Proof. We construct two sequences < Bi| i ∈ ω > and < ki| i ∈ ω > by induction.
Let B0 be A and k0 be min(B0). Suppose < Bi| 0 ≤ i ≤ n > and < ki| 0 ≤ i ≤ n >
have been defined. Let < tj| 0 ≤ j < 2kn+1 > be an enumeration of [kn + 1]<ω. By
Claim 2.2.4, there is some B<n+1>,0 ⊆ Bn such that B<n+1,0> captures (t0, D). By
induction, we get a ⊆ −decending sequence < B<n+1,j>| 0 ≤ j < 2kn+1 > such that
B<n+1,j> captures tj for every 0 ≤ j < 2kn+1. Then let Bn+1 be the last element in
this sequence, and let kn+1 be min(Bn+1). Finally we have the following.
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• ∀i ∈ ω, ki = min(Bi);
• ∀i ∈ ω,Bi+1 ⊆ Bi;
• ∀i ∈ ω,∀t ∈ [ki + 1]<ω, Bi+1 captures (t,D).
Now let B be the set {ki| i ∈ ω}. Let s ∈ [ω]<ω with max(s) ∈ B and E ⊆ B − s.
Assume that min(E) = km and max(s) = kj, then j < m. Moreover, E ⊆ Bm. Since
j < m, Bm captures (s,D). So there is some t such that t is an initial segment of E
and (sˆ t, E − t) ∈ D. Hence B captures (s,D).
Work in M . Let A = {A ⊆ [ω]ω| A is a almost disjoint family and ∀X ∈ A∀s ∈
[ω]<ω,max(s) ∈ X ⇒ X − s captures (s,D)}. Then ⊆ is a natural order on A. By
Zorn’s lemma, there is some A, a ⊆ −maximal element of A. Then we claim that A
is a maximal almost disjoint family. Otherwise, there is some A such that A ∪ {A}
is also almost disjoint. By Claim 2.2.5, there is some B ⊆ A such that A∪ {B} ∈ A.
This is a contradiction.
Now in V , by the assumption of x, there is some X ∈ A, such that x \X is finite.
Let s be an initial segment of x such that x− s ⊆ X and max(s) ∈ X. Then X − s
captures (s,D).
Define a tree T = {t ∈ [X − s]<ω| (stˆ, X − s ∩ t) 6∈ D}. In M , this tree T is
wellfounded. (As otherwise, let Y ∈ [T ], then Y ∈ [X]ω. Since X − s captures (s,D),
there is some t such that t is an initial segment of Y and (sˆ t, X − s ∪ t) ∈ D. Then
t 6∈ T . Contradiction.) Then by Shoenfield’s absoluteness [19], T is also wellfounded
in V . So there is some t ≺ x−s, such that t 6∈ T . This implies that (sˆ t, X−s∪t) ∈ D.
Since x ∈ [sˆ t, X−s∪t]ω, (sˆ t, X−s∪t) ∈ Gx. So Gx∩D 6= ∅. Hence Gx is P−generic
over M . In other words, x is a Mathias real.
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An immediate corollary to the Mathias property is the following:
Corollary 2.2.6. In V , let x be P−generic over M . Then for any y ∈ [x]ω, y is also
P−generic over M .
So far we have reviewed some nice properties of the Mathias forcing. However, the
existence of Mathias reals remains uncertain. In case of the non-existence of Mathias
reals, the Mathias forcing will become meaningless. Fortunately, we are going to work
in the context of determinacy which guarantees the existence of Mathias reals.
2.3 The Axiom of Determinacy
Recall the description of determinacy from the introduction chapter. The axiom of
determinacy states that for every set A ⊆ ωω, one of the two players in the associated
game GA has a winning strategy.
Remark 2.3.1. Since the set ω<ω is countable, every strategy is actually a function
from ω to ω. Every such function can be coded by some element in 2ω. So in some
sense every strategy is an element in 2ω.
The axiom of determinacy is very attractive because it is quite different from the
standard axiomatic system ZFC. In fact, the axiom of determinacy contradicts the
Axiom of Choice. So in the world of AD, the structure of sets is very fuzzy since
most sets cannot be wellordered. Hence it is a great challenge to discover a clearer
picture of the structure in the context of AD.
Let σ be a strategy and b be in ωω. Then let σ ∗ b denote the resulting sequence
in the game where player II plays b while player I follows σ, and b ∗ σ denote the
resulting sequence in the game where player I plays b while player II follows σ.
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Theorem 2.3.1 (Gale and Stewart [8]). Assuming that there is a wellorder on 2ω,
then there is some A ⊆ ωω, such that GA is not determined.
Proof. Assume that there is a wellordering on 2ω. By Remark 2.3.1, we can assume
that there is a wellorder on the collection of all strategies. Let < σα| α < κ > be an
enumeration of all strategies, where κ is a cardinal. We are going to construct two
sequences < xα| α < κ > and < yα| α < κ > by induction on α. Suppose γ < κ, and
< xα| α < γ > and < yα| α < γ > are already defined. Let Aγ = {σγ ∗ b| b ∈ ωω}
and Bγ = {b ∗ σγ| b ∈ ωω}. Then both Aγ and Bγ have the cardinality of κ. So we
can pick xγ ∈ Bγ \ {yα| α < γ} and yγ ∈ Aγ \ {xα| α ≤ γ} since γ < κ and κ is
a cardinal. Finally we get two sequences < xα| α < κ > and < yα| α < κ >. Let
X = {xα| α < κ} and Y = {yα| α < κ}. Then X and Y are disjoint.
Now we check that the game GX is not determined. Suppose player I has a winning
strategy σβ in the game GX . Then yβ = σβ ∗ b for some b. So player II can defeat σβ
by playing this b. Contradiction. Therefore, player I can not have a winning strategy
in this game. Similarly, player II cannot have a winning strategy in the game GX .
Hence the game GX is not determined.
Although we cannot use the Axiom of Choice in the context of determinacy, the
determinacy itself is a very powerful statement. We are enabled to construct different
kinds of games, and all games are determined as long as their payoff sets1 can be
coded by subsets of ωω. Therefore, AD is very useful to investigate properties of sets
of reals. As mentioned in the introduction chapter, sets of reals are well behaved in
the context of Determinacy.
1The payoff set of a game is the set such that player I wins if and only if the outcoming play falls
into this set.
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Theorem 2.3.2. Assume the Axiom of Determinacy. Then:
(i)(Mycielski and S´wierczkowski [13]) Every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable.
(ii)(Banach and Mazur) Every set of reals has the property of Baire.
(iii)(Davis [4]) Every uncountable set of reals has a perfect subset.
In Davis’ proof for (iii), given an uncountable A ⊆ [ω]ω, he actually constructed
a perfect tree2 T ⊆ [ω]<ω such that [T ]3⊆ A. So if T is a perfect tree, then [T ] is a
perfect set in the usual topology (Baire space). Moreover, there is a injection from 2ω
to [T ] since T is a perfect tree. Therefore, under AD, if A ⊆ [ω]ω is uncountable, then
there is a injection from 2ω to A. Hence, if there is a wellordering on an uncountable
A, this wellordering will induce a wellordering on 2ω, which contradicts Theorem 2.3.1.
In other words, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.3.3. Assume ZF + AD. There is no sequence of distinct reals with
uncountable length.
From this corollary, every wellorderable set of reals is countable. In particular,
suppose M |= ZFC and V |= AD, then every set of reals in M is countable in V .
In other words, sets of reals in M are very small in V . Conversely speaking, ℵV1 is
quite large in M , where ℵ1 is the first uncountable cardinal and ℵV1 refers to the first
uncountable cardinal in V .
Definition 2.3.1. Let M be a transitive model of ZFC and κ be a regular cardinal
in M . Then in M , κ is inaccessible if ∀λ ∈ OrdM(λ < κ⇒ 2λ < κ) where Ord refers
to the class of all ordinals.
2T ⊆ [ω]<ω is a tree if it is closed under initial segments. A tree T is perfect if ∀s ∈ T (|{a| sˆ a ∈
T}| > 1).
3[T ] = {x| ∀s ≺ x, s ∈ T}. Such [T ] is called the path of the tree T .
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Lemma 2.3.4 (Folklore). (ZF + AD) Let M be a transitive model of ZFC. Then
ℵV1 is inaccessible in M .
Proof. First, ℵV1 is regular in V , so it is regular in M .
Second, to derive a contradiction, assume that λ ∈ OrdM such that M |= (λ <
ℵV1 ∧ ℵV1 ≤ 2λ). Then there is an injection f ∈ M from ℵV1 to Pω(λ) where Pω(λ)
refers to the collection of countably infinite subsets of λ. Moreover, λ is countable in
V since M |= λ < ℵV1 . So there is a bijection g from λ onto ω. Then g induces a
bijection g∗ from Pω(λ) to Pω(ω), where g∗(A) = {g(α)| α ∈ A} for A ∈ Pω(λ). So
g∗ ◦f is an injection from ℵV1 to Pω(ω). Hence g∗ ◦f represents a sequence of distinct
reals with length ℵV1 . This contradicts Corollary 2.3.3.
This lemma is very helpful to do some analysis of a small forcing defined in a
transitive model. To be precise, assume that V |= AD and M is a transitive model
of ZFC. Let P = (P,≤) be a forcing notion in M such that every condition in P
can be coded by a real. Then by Lemma 2.3.4, P is a countable set in V and the
collection of all dense subsets of P in M is also countable in V .
In particular, let P = (P,≤) be a Mathias forcing in M and let D be the collection
{D ∈ P(P ) ∩M | D is a dense subset of P}. In M , every condition in P is actually
a real, so M |= (|P | = |ωω| = |2ω|). Moreover, M |= (|D| ≤ |22ω |) since every dense
subset of P can be coded by a subset of reals. By Lemma 2.3.4, ℵV1 is inaccessible
in M . Hence both P and D are countable in V . Suppose < Di| i ∈ ω > is an
enumeration of D in V and (s0, A0) is some condition in P . Since D0 is dense, there
is some (s1, A1) ∈ D0 such that (s1, A1) < (s0, A0) and |s1| > |s0|. By induction, we
can get a sequence of conditions < (si, Ai)| i ∈ ω > such that ∀i ∈ ω
• (si+1, Ai+1) ∈ Di;
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• (si+1, Ai+1) < (si, Ai);
• |si+1| > |si|.
Let G be the set {p ∈ P | ∃i ∈ ω(si, Ai) ≤ p}. Then it is straitforward to verify that
G is P−generic over M . Moreover, the corresponding Mathias real is ∪{si| i ∈ ω}.
Hence Mathias reals exist in V . Then by Corollary 2.2.6, every real in [x]ω is also a
Mathias real provided that x is a Mathias real. So in some sense, the collection of all
Mathias reals in V is quite large.
Moreover, let A be the collection of all m.a.d. families in M , then A is also
countable in V . Let in V , < pi| i ∈ ω > be a enumeration of P and < Ai| i ∈ ω > be
a enumeration of all m.a.d. families in M .
Let X be the collection of all reals P−generic over M . Then X is not empty.
Consider the topology on X where the basic open sets are Np = {x ∈ X | p ∈ Gx} for
p ∈ P and Gx is the set {(s, A) ∈ P | s ≺ x ⊆ s ∪ A}.
Theorem 2.3.5 (Folklore). The topological space X admits the Baire Category The-
orem. i.e., the intersection of arbitrary countably many open dense sets is dense.
Proof. Let < Di| i ∈ ω > be a sequence of dense open sets. Fix a condition (s, A) ∈ P .
We have to construct a Mathias real in N(s,A)∩(
⋂
i∈ω
Di) 6= ∅. By the Mathias property,
it is sufficient to construct a real x ∈ N(s,A) ∩ (
⋂
i∈ω
Di) 6= ∅ such that ∀i ∈ ω∃X ∈
Ai(x \X) is finite.
For i = 0, A0 is a m.a.d. family, so there is some A0 ∈ A0 such that A ∩ A0 is
infinite. Let A∗0 = A ∩ A0. Then (s, A∗0) ∈ P . Since D0 is open dense, there is some
(s0, B0) ∈ P such that N(s0,B0) ⊆ N(s,A∗0) ∩D0 and |s0| > |s|.
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Suppose (si, Bi) has been defined. Then since Ai+1 is a m.a.d. family, there is
some Ai+1 ∈ Ai+1 such that Bi ∩ Ai+1 is infinite. Let A∗i+1 be Bi ∩ Ai+1. Then
(si, A
∗
i+1) ∈ P . Since Di+1 is open dense, there is some (si+1, Bi+1) ∈ P such that
N(si+1,Bi+1) ⊆ N(si,A∗i+1) ∩Di+1 and |si+1| > |si|.
Finally we get < si, Bi, Ai, A
∗
i | i ∈ ω > such that ∀i ∈ ω,
• Ai ∈ Ai;
• A∗i+1 = Bi ∩ Ai+1;
• N(si+1,Bi+1) ⊆ N(si,A∗i+1) ∩Di+1;




si. Then ∀i ∈ ω, x ⊆ si ∪ Bi. Since Bi ⊆ Ai+1, x \ Ai+1 is finite.
Moreover, it is clear that x \ A0 is finite since x ⊆ s ∪ A0. So x \ Ai is finite for all
i ∈ ω. Then by the Mathias property, x is a Mathias real. In other words, x ∈ X .





This proof also gives another reason why Mathias reals exists. By a relative
argument, for every B ∈ [ω]ω, there are Mathias reals in [B]ω.
As we summarized in the previous section, AD implies that every set of reals has
the Baire property in the usual topology.
Definition 2.3.2. Let X be a topological space. A subset of this space is nowhere-
dense if its complement is open and dense. A subset is meager if it is included by a
union of countably many nowheredense set. A subset is comeager if its complement
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is meager. A subset A has the Baire property if there is some open set U such that
the symmetric difference A∆U is meager.
Remark 2.3.2. Suppose U is an open set and A is a set which has the Baire property
and is not meager in U . Then by the definition, there is some smaller open set W ⊆ U
such that W∆A is meager. Since A is not meager, W cannot be empty. Since W∆A
is meager, A is comeager in W . In summary, if a set A is not meager in an open set
U , then A is comeager in some smaller open set. Similarly, if A is not comeager in
some open set, then A is meager in some smaller open set.
The proof of that every set has the Baire property involves the Banach-Mazur
game(see Oxtoby’s book [14]). Generally, let Y be an arbitrary topological space and
A be a subset of Y . The Banach-Mazur game for this A is defined in the following
way. Two players play basic open sets turn by turn, with the requirement that every
new basic open set is smaller than the previous one. Finally the two players give a




Wi) 6= ∅. Banach and Mazur invented this game and proved that player II
has a winning strategy if and only if A is meager. Here we want to use this game
to prove that every subset of X has the Baire property. Since every basic open set
in X is a real, AD cannot guarantee that such games are determined. However, as
we have mentioned, there are only countably many basic open sets. So we can use a
natural number to present a basic open set.
Theorem 2.3.6 (Banach and Mazur). Every subset of X has the property of Baire.
Proof. Let A be a subset of X . Consider the game GA:
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I : n0, n1, ...
II : m0, m1, ...
Rules: pn0 ≥ pm0 ≥ pn1 ≥ pm1 ≥ ...
The first player conflicting the rules loses. If both players obey the rules all the




Claim 2.3.7. Player II has a winning strategy in the game GA if and only if A is
meager.
Proof. First suppose A is meager. Then there are countably many open dense sets
{Dk| k ∈ ω}, such that
⋂
k∈ω
Dk ⊆ Ac. Assume in the game GA, player I plays nk at the












Dk ⊆ Ac. Hence this is a winning strategy for player
II.
Now suppose player II has a winning strategy τ . For a ∈ [ω]ω with |a| even,
we say a is good if a is a partial play consistent with τ . Let pa be the condition
corresponding to the last number in a, and Aa be the collection of all legal plays for







Then Wa is open dense for every good a. Let W =
⋂{Wa| a good}, then W is
comeager. By Theorem 2.3.5, W is not empty. Let x ∈ W . Since x ∈ W∅, there
is some n0 ∈ ω, such that x ∈ W<n0,τ(<n0>)>. Finally we can find a legal play






A similar argument shows that player I has a winning strategy if and only if A is
comeager in some basic open set.
Now let E be union of all basic open sets Np such that A is comeager in Np.
Then E is open and E \A is meager, since there are only countably many basic open
sets. Consider the game GA\E. In this game, player I cannot have a winning strategy
as otherwise A \ E must be comeager in some basic open set, which contradicts
the definition of E. Hence player II has a winning strategy in this game. Then by
Claim 2.3.7, A \ E is meager. So A has the property of Baire.
In this game, it is possible that player I wins a play because the intersection is
empty, which means that there is no Mathias real in the intersection. However, there
is no strategy for player I which guarantees that the intersection is always empty.
The reason is that player II can also control ω many steps. In the i−th round, player
II can play a condition (s, A) such that A \ B is finite for some B ∈ Ai. Then any
real in the intersection must be a Mathias real since it satisfies the Mathias property.
2.4 AD+
AD+ was first introduced by Woodin as an extension of AD. Most of the AD+ theory
are due to Woodin [24]. The original motivation of AD+ is to abstract the theory of
models of AD. As the theory develops, it turns out that one is actually investigating
the properties of “definable” sets of reals. This is why∞−Borel sets were introduced.
Definition 2.4.1 (Woodin). AD+ is AD +DCR together with
• Every set of reals is ∞−Borel;
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• Ordinal determinacy.
To define the ordinal determinacy, we need to introduce some notations first.
Definition 2.4.2. Assume ZF +AD+DC. Θ = sup{α ∈ Ord| there is a surjection
from ωω to α}.
Definition 2.4.3. Ordinal determinacy is the statement that for any ordinal λ < Θ,
any A ⊆ ωω and any continuous map pi from λω to ωω, the preimage of A under pi is
determined.
Here the topology on λω is the product topology with respect to the discrete
topology on λ. A subset of λω is determined if the associate game is determined,
where the two players play ordinals in λ one by one.
∞−Borel sets are defined by an inductive construction.
Let < Ni| i ∈ ω > be an enumeration of all basic open sets in the Baire space.
Let Ac be the interpretation of the ∞−Borel code c. Then
• Each natural number i is an ∞−Borel code. Its interpretation Ac is Ni.
• If c is an ∞−Borel code, then the ordered pair < 0, c > is also an ∞−Borel
code, and A<0,c> is the complement of Ac.
• If ~c =< cα| α < κ > is a sequence of ∞−Borel codes, then < 1,~c > is also an




Definition 2.4.4. A set of reals is ∞−Borel if it is the interpretation of some
∞−Borel code.
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The ∞−Borel codes simulate how sets are constructed from simpler sets, and
∞−Borel sets are the interpretation of such codes.
In order to prove that AD+ implies that every set of reals is Ramsey, it suffices to
show that every ∞−Borel set is Ramsey in the context of AD+. For the concept of
∞−Borel set, there are many equivalent ways to define it. The following definition
is more convenient for our purpose.
Definition 2.4.5. Let A be a set of reals. A is ∞−Borel if there exist a subset of
ordinals S and a Σ1 formula with two free variables ϕ(u,w) such that
x ∈ A⇔ L[S, x] |= ϕ(S, x).
Here L[S, x] is the collection of all sets constructible where x and elements in S
can be used as parameters (see chapter 13 of [10]). It is an inner model of ZFC.
Theorem 2.4.1 (Woodin). Assume AD+. Then every set of reals is Ramsey.
Proof. Fix a set of reals A. Then A is ∞−Borel. Hence there exist some set of
ordinals S and a formula ϕ such that
x ∈ A⇔ L[S, x] |= ϕ(S, x).
Let P = (P,≤) be the Mathias forcing defined in L[S]. Since L[S] is an inner model
of ZFC and we have V |= AD, Mathias reals for L[S] exist. In fact, for every
B ∈ ([ω]ω)L[S], there is some Mathias real in [B]ω. Now by Prikry condition, there
is some B ∈ L[S] such that (∅, B) decides ϕ(S, x˙G), where x˙G is the name for the
Mathias real.
Without the loss of generality, we assume that (∅, B)  ϕ(S, x˙G). Let x ∈ [B]ω
be a Mathias real. Then by Corollary 2.2.6, every y ∈ [x]ω is also a Mathias real.
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Moreover, (∅, B) ∈ Gy for each y ∈ [x]ω since Gy is defined to be the set {(t,W ) ∈
P | y ∈ [t,W ]ω}. So for each y ∈ [x]ω, L[S, y] |= ϕ(S, y). Hence [x]ω ⊆ A. Therefore,
A is Ramsey.
The proof of this theorem gives us some hint that the Mathias forcing is really
useful to investigate the Ramsey property.
Woodin also proved that assuming V = L(R), AD and AD+ are equivalent. Hence
assuming that V = L(R) and AD, every set of reals is Ramsey, which is an early
result of Martin and Steel [11].
The common advantage between V = L(R) and the assumption that every set is
∞−Borel is that they both give a clear definability of sets of reals. Under either of the
two assumptions, each set of reals can be coded by a triple set consisting of a formula,
a set of ordinals and a real. However, without such assumptions, the definability of
sets of reals becomes uncertain. So the argument in the proof of Theorem 2.4.1 does
not work in the context of ZF + AD +DC. We have to find a new direction.
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Chapter 3
On the Ramsey Property
In this chapter, we introduce a weaker version of Ramsey property. The motivation
is to approximate the Ramsey property by some weaker version.
The weakly Ramsey property defined in this chapter has are two advantages. One
is that this weakly Ramsey property is weak enough to be satisfied by most sets of
reals in the context of AD. The other is that it is strong enough to prove that every
set of reals is Ramsey provided that every invariant set of reals is Ramsey.
Throughout this chapter, we assume ZF +DC + AD.
3.1 Weakly Ramsey Property
Recall some definitions and conventions from the introduction chapter.
A set of reals A is Ramsey if there is some H ∈ [ω]ω such that [H]ω ⊆ A or
[H]ω ∩ A = ∅. Such H is called a homogeneous set for A.
We also define the Ramsey property of maps. Let pi be a map from [ω]ω to n
for some n ∈ ω. Then pi is Ramsey if there is some H ∈ [ω]ω such that pi [H]ω is
constant. It is easy to see that every set of reals is Ramsey is equivalent to that every
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map from [ω]ω to some natural number is Ramsey.
Definition 3.1.1. For two reals x and y, x ∼ y if ∃k ∈ ω such that x \ k = y \ k.
Another way to describe this relation is that two infinite sets of natural numbers
are only differ on a finite part. It is easy to see that this relation ∼ is an equivalence
relation on reals.
Definition 3.1.2. For a real x, let [x]∼ be the equivalence class of x with respect to
the relation ∼.
A set of reals A is weakly Ramsey if there is some real x, such that [x]∼ ⊆ A or
[x]∼ ∩A = ∅. A is locally weakly Ramsey if ([x]ω ∩ [x]∼) ⊆ A or ([x]ω ∩ [x]∼)∩A = ∅
for some real x.
In other words, the weakly Ramsey property is similar to the Ramsey property
where [x]ω is replaced by [x]∼.
From the definition of ∼, every equivalence class of some real is countable. Hence
in order to construct a real x witnessing a set of reals A is weakly Ramsey or locally
weakly Ramsey, we only have to handle countably many requirements. This nice
property enables us to prove that every set of reals is locally weakly Ramsey.
There is an interesting similarity between the Ramsey property and the locally
weakly Ramsey property. If a set A is locally weakly Ramsey concentrating on some
subspace [H]ω (i.e. the set A/(∅, H) is locally weakly Ramsey), then A is also locally
weakly Ramsey in the whole space [ω]ω. However, this is not true for weakly Ramsey.
Nevertheless, for certain kind of sets, we can construct reals in every subspace [H]ω
to witness that these sets are weakly Ramsey.
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Theorem 3.1.1. Let pi be a map from [ω]ω onto {0, 1}.
(a) ∃σ ∈ [ω]ω∀τ ∈ [σ]ω(τ ∼ σ ⇒ pi(τ) = pi(σ));
(b) Suppose the set {k ∈ ω| pi((x \ k) ∪ s) = 0} is cofinite for all x ∈ [ω]ω and
s ∈ [ω]<ω. Then
∀H ∈ [ω]ω∃σ ∈ [H]ω∀τ ∈ [ω]ω(τ ∼ σ ⇒ pi(τ) = 0).
Proof. (a) Fix some map pi. Let HOD[pi] be the class of sets hereditarily ordinal
definable from pi. Then HOD[pi] is an inner model of ZFC. A set x is in HOD[pi] if
and only if its transitive closure tran({x}) is ordinal definable over pi (see chapter 13
of [10]). Let P = (P,≤) be the Mathias forcing defined in HOD[pi].
Work in V . Let X be the collection of all Mathias reals with the topology defined in
Chapter 2. Then this topological space admits the Baire Category Theorem and every
subset of this space has the Baire property. Now we concentrate on this topological
space.
Let O be the preimage of {0} under pi. Define
Y0 = {p ∈ P | O is comeager in Np};
and
Y1 = {p ∈ P | Oc is comeager in Np}.
Then Y0 and Y1 are both in HOD[pi].
Lemma 3.1.2. Y0 ∪ Y1 is dense in P .
Proof. Pick some condition p ∈ P . If O is comeager in Np, we are done since p ∈ Y0
in this case.
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Now assume that O is not comeager in Np. By Theorem 2.3.6, every subset of
the topological space X has the Baire property. So is O. Then by Remark 2.3.2, O
is meager in some smaller open set. So there is some q ∈ P such that q ≤ p and Oc
is comeager in Nq. Hence q ∈ Y1. Therefore, Y0 ∪ Y1 is dense in P .
By this lemma, G∩(Y0∪Y1) 6= ∅ for all generic G. Therefore, 1  G˙∩(Y0∪Y1) 6= ∅,
where 1 stands for the weakest condition (∅, ω).
By the Prikry condition, there is some H in HOD[pi], such that (∅, H) decides
the sentence G˙ ∩ Y0 6= ∅.
Now we have two cases: (∅, H)  G˙ ∩ Y0 6= ∅ or (∅, H)  G˙ ∩ Y0 = ∅. In case of
(∅, H)  G˙ ∩ Y0 = ∅, (∅, H)  G˙ ∩ Y1 6= ∅ because 1  G˙ ∩ (Y0 ∪ Y1) 6= ∅. Therefore,
the two cases can be rephrased as (∅, H)  G˙ ∩ Y0 6= ∅ or (∅, H)  G˙ ∩ Y1 6= ∅. Here
we assume (∅, H)  G˙ ∩ Y0 6= ∅ since the proof for the case (∅, H)  G˙ ∩ Y1 6= ∅ is
the same.
Lemma 3.1.3. O is comeager in N(∅,H).
Proof. Suppose O is not comeager in N(∅,H). Because O has the Baire property, O
is meager in some smaller open set by Remark 2.3.2. Hence there is some condition
(s,W ) ∈ P , such that (s,W ) is stronger than (∅, H), and Oc is comeager in N(s,W ).
As discussed in chapter 2, Mathias reals exist in each basic open set. Let G be a
P−generic set over HOD[pi] containing (s,W ). Then HOD[pi][G] |= G∩Y0 6= ∅ since
(s,W )  G˙ ∩ Y0 6= ∅. So G ∩ Y0 6= ∅.
Let (t, B) be a condition in G ∩ Y0. Then O is comeager in N(t,B) since N(t,B) ⊆
N(s,W ). Since G is generic, there is some (r,Q) ∈ G, such that (r,Q) is stronger than
both (s,W ) and (t, B).
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Hence, O is comeager in N(r,Q) since O is comeager in N(t,B); and O
c is comeager in
N(r,Q) since O
c is comeager in N(s,W ). In other words, O is both meager and comeager
in N(r,Q). This contradicts Theorem 2.3.5 (The Baire Category Theorem).
Now let < Dk| k ∈ ω > be a sequence of open dense sets in N(∅,H) such that⋂
k∈ω
Dk ⊆ O. To construct a real σ witnessing that pi is locally weakly Ramsey, it
suffices to make sure τ ∈
⋂
k∈ω
Dk for all τ ∈ [σ]ω ∩ [σ]∼. And τ ∈ [σ]ω ∩ [σ]∼ is
equivalent to the statement τ = σ \ a for some a ∈ [σ]<ω. So the following sets arise.
For a ∈ [H]<ω, define
E<k,a> = {x ∈ X | (x \ a) ∈ Dk}.
Lemma 3.1.4. For each k ∈ ω and a ∈ [H]<ω, E<k,a> is open dense in N(∅,H).
Proof. Fix k and a.
First, we prove that E<k,a> is open. Let x be in E<k,a>. It is sufficient to find
some open set containing x and contained in E<k,a>.
By the definition of E<k,a>, (x \ a) ∈ Dk. Since Dk is open in N(∅,H), there is
some (s, A) ∈ P such that (x \ a) ∈ N(s,A) ⊆ Dk. Moreover, we can assume that
max(s) > max(a). Let t be an initial segment of x such that max(t) = max(s).
Then (t \ a) = s and x \ t ⊆ A. In other words, x ∈ N(t,A).
Now we check that the basic open set N(t,A) is included by E<k,a>. For any
y ∈ N(t,A), t is an initial segment of y and (y \ t) ⊆ A. So (y \ a) = (t \ a)∪ (y ∩A) =
s ∪ (y ∩ A). So (y \ a) ∈ N(s,A) ⊆ Dk. Hence y ∈ E<k,a>. Since y is an arbitrary set
in N(t,A), N(t,A) ⊆ E<k,a>. Therefore, x ∈ N(t,A) ⊆ E<k,a>. Hence E<k,a> is open.
Second, we prove that E<k,a> is dense in N(∅,H). Let (s, A) ∈ P be such that
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N(s,A) ⊆ N(∅,H). This implies that s ∪ A ∈ [H]ω. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that max(s) > max(a). It is sufficient to prove that N(s,A) ∩ E<k,a> 6= ∅.
Let t = (s \ a). Then t ∪A ⊆ s ∪A ∈ [H]ω. So N(t,A) ⊆ N(∅,H). Since Dk is dense
in N(∅,H), Dk ∩ N(t,A) 6= ∅. Hence there is some x ∈ N(t,A) ∩ Dk. So t is an initial
segment of x and x \ t ⊆ A. Let y = s ∪ (x ∩ A). So y starts with s and ends with
a tail part of x. Then by the Mathias property, y is also a Mathias real. Moreover,
(y \a) = (s\a)∪ (x∩A) = t∪ (x∩A) = x ∈ Dk. In fact, y = s∪ (x∩A) = s∪ (x\ t).
So y ∈ N(s,A) ∩ E<k,a>. Hence E<k,a> is dense in N(∅,H).
By Theorem 2.3.5 (The Baire Category Theorem), the set
⋂{E<k,a>| k ∈ ω, a ∈
[H]<ω} is not empty since it is the intersection of countably many sets open dense
in N(∅,H). Pick some σ in this intersection. Now we check that this σ satisfies the
requirement of this theorem.
Let τ ∈ [σ]ω and τ ∼ σ. Then τ ∈ [H]ω since σ ∈ [H]ω. Moreover, there is some
a ∈ [H]<ω such that τ = σ \ a since τ ∼ σ. Since σ ∈ ⋂{E<k,a>| k ∈ ω, a ∈ [H]<ω},




(b) Fix pi and H. Let HOD[pi,H] be the class of sets hereditarily ordinal definable
from pi and H. Then HOD[pi,H] is an inner model of ZFC. Let P = (P,≤) be the
Mathias forcing in HOD[pi,H]. Let X be the collection of all P−generic reals over
HOD[pi,H] with the topology defined in Chapter 2. Then this topological space
admits the Baire Category Theorem and every subset of this space has the Baire
property. Now concentrate on this topological space and let O be the preimage of
{0} under pi. Define as in part(a)
Y0 = {p ∈ P | O is comeager in Np};
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and
Y1 = {p ∈ P | Oc is comeager in Np}.
Then Y0 and Y1 are both in HOD[pi,H].
As in the proof of part(a), Y0 ∪ Y1 is dense in P. So 1 G˙ ∩ (Y0 ∪ Y1) 6= ∅.
So far, the argument is the same as in part(a). Now the difference arises here. As
shown in part(a), we used the Prikry condition to find a subspace whereO is comeager.
All the argument in part(a) thereafter is restricted to this subspace. However, this
kind of trick does not apply here because the variable τ in the requirement of part(b)
is not bounded. This is why we need the additional hypothesis that the set {k ∈
ω| pi((x \ k) ∪ s) = 0} is cofinite for all x ∈ [ω]ω and s ∈ [ω]<ω. This hypothesis
guarantees that O is not only comeager in some subspace, but also comeager in the
whole space. As in part(a), we have the following lemma analogue to Lemma 3.1.3.
Lemma 3.1.5. (∅, ω)  G˙ ∩ Y0 6= ∅.
Proof. It suffices to show that ∀(s, A) ∈ P ∃B ⊆ A, such that (s, B)  G˙ ∩ Y0 6= ∅.
Fix some (s, A) ∈ P . By the Prikry condition, there is some B ⊆ A such that
(s, B) decides G˙∩Y0 6= ∅. To derive a contradiction, assume that (s, B)  G˙∩Y0 = ∅.
Since 1 G˙ ∩ (Y0 ∪ Y1) 6= ∅, we have (s, B)  G˙ ∩ Y1 6= ∅. Then by the proof
of part(a), we get that ∃σ ∈ [B]ω∀τ ∈ [σ]ω(τ ∼ σ ⇒ pi(s ∪ τ) = 1). But by the
assumption of pi, the set {k ∈ ω| pi((σ \ k) ∪ s) = 0} is cofinite. So there is some
k such that pi(s ∪ (σ \ k)) = 0. However, pi(s ∪ (σ \ k)) = 1 since σ \ k ∈ [σ]ω and
σ \ k ∼ σ. We get a contradiction.
Then by the proof of Lemma 3.1.3, O is comeager in N(∅,ω) = X . Let < Dk| k ∈
ω > be a sequence of open dense sets such that
⋂
k∈ω
Dk ⊆ O. Since τ ∼ σ if and only
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if τ = (σ \ a) ∪ b for some a ∈ [ω]<ω and b ∈ [ω]<ω, we consider the following sets.
For all a ∈ [ω]<ω and b ∈ [ω]<ω, define
E<k,a,b> = {x ∈ X | (x \ a) ∪ b ∈ Dk}.
Lemma 3.1.6. E<k,a,b> is open dense for all k ∈ ω and a, b ∈ [ω]<ω.
Proof. The proof of this claim is almost the same as the proof of Lemma 3.1.4.
Fix k, a and b.
First, we prove that E<k,a,b> is open. Let x be in E<k,a,b>. It is sufficient to find
some open set containing x and included by E<k,a,b>.
By the definition of E<k,a,b>, (x \ a) ∪ b ∈ Dk. Since Dk is open, there is some
(s, A) ∈ P such that (x \ a) ∪ b ∈ N(s,A) ⊆ Dk. Moreover, we can assume that
max(s) > max(a ∪ b). Let t be an initial segment of x such that max(t) = max(s).
Then (t \ a) ∪ b = s and x \ t ⊆ A. In other words, x ∈ N(t,A).
Now we check that the basic open set N(t,A) is included by E<k,a,b>. For any
y ∈ N(t,A), t is an initial segment of y. So (y \a)∪b = (t\a)∪b∪ (y∩A) = s∪ (y∩A).
So (y \ a) ∪ b ∈ N(s,A) ⊆ Dk. Since y is an arbitrary real in N(t,A), N(t,A) ⊆ E<k,a,b>.
Hence x ∈ N(t,A) ⊆ E<k,a,b>. Therefore, E<k,a,b> is open.
Second, we prove that E<k,a,b> is dense in N(∅,H). Let (s, A) ∈ P be an arbitrary
condition. Without loss of generality, we can assume that max(s) > max(a ∪ b). It
is sufficient to prove that N(s,A) ∩ E<k,a,b> 6= ∅.
Let t = (s \ a) ∪ b. Since Dk is dense, Dk ∩ N(t,A) 6= ∅. Hence there is some
x ∈ N(t,A)∩Dk. So t is an initial segment of x and x\ t ⊆ A. Let y = s∪ (x∩A). So y
starts with s and ends with x∩A a tail part of x. Then by the Mathias property, y is
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also a Mathias real. Moreover, (y \a)∪b = (s\a)∪b∪ (x∩A) = t∪ (x∩A) = x ∈ Dk.
So y ∈ N(s,A) ∩ E<k,a>. Hence E<k,a> is dense in N(∅,H).
Since the topological space X admits the Baire Category Theorem and (∅, H) ∈ P ,
the set N(∅,H) ∩ (
⋂{E<k,a,b>| k ∈ ω, a ∈ [ω]<ω, b ∈ [ω]<ω}) is not empty. Pick some σ
in this intersection. Then σ ∈ [H]ω since σ ∈ N(∅,H).
We check that this σ satisfies the requirement. Let τ ∈ [ω]ω be such that τ ∼ σ.
Then there are a, b ∈ [ω]<ω such that τ = (σ\a)∪b. Since σ ∈ ⋂{E<k,a,b>| k ∈ ω, a ∈
[ω]<ω, b ∈ [ω]<ω}, τ ∈ Dk for all k ∈ ω. So τ ∈
⋂
k∈ω
Dk ⊆ O. Hence pi(τ) = 0.
With this weakly Ramsey theorem in hand, we proceed to the main theorem in
the next section.
3.2 Ramsey Property
Recall the definition of invariant sets.
Definition 3.2.1. Let A be a set of reals. A is invariant if ∀x, y ∈ [ω]ω, (x ∈ A∧x ∼
y)⇒ y ∈ A.
Let pi be a map from [ω]ω to k for some k ∈ ω. Then pi is invariant if ∀x, y ∈ [ω]ω,
x ∼ y ⇒ pi(x) = pi(y).
Throughout this part, we assume that every invariant set of reals is Ramsey.
Hence every invariant map from reals to some natural number is also Ramsey. Our
goal is to prove that every set of reals is Ramsey.
Fix some map pi from [ω]ω to {0, 1}. The aim is to construct a homogenous set
for pi. The first step is to modify pi to some new map pi∗ satisfying the following
requirement.
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(∗) For some i ∈ {0, 1} the set {k ∈ ω| pi∗((x \ k)∪ s) = i} is cofinite for all x ∈ [ω]ω
and s ∈ [ω]<ω.
Then we can apply Theorem 3.1.1(b) to this pi∗. In order to test to which degree
pi satisfies this requirement, we introduce the following maps.
For s ∈ [ω]<ω, define
es(x) =

0 if {k ∈ x| pi((x \ k) ∪ s) = 0} is cofinite;
1 if {k ∈ x| pi((x \ k) ∪ s) = 1} is cofinite;
2 otherwise.
Then es is an invariant map. So there is some σs ∈ [ω]ω, such that es is constant on
[σs]
ω.
Recall that for s ∈ [ω]<ω, x ∈ [ω]ω with that min(x) > max(s) and pi be a map
from [ω]ω to some natural number, we use pi/(s, x) to denote the map pi∗ defined as
pi∗(z) = pi(sˆ < x(z(i))| i ∈ ω >). In some sense, pi∗ codes the behavior of pi in the
subspace [s, x]ω.
Claim 3.2.1. Let es be defined as above and σs be a homogeneous set for σs. Then
es cannot be the constant 2 on [σs]
ω.
Proof. To derive a contradiction, assume that es is the constant 2 on [σs]
ω. Without
loss of generality, we assume that min(σs) > max(s). Apply Theorem 3.1.1(a) to
pi/(s, σs), then there is some x ∈ [σs]ω such that ∀y ∈ [x]ω(y ∼ x ⇒ pi(s ∪ y) =
pi(s ∪ x)). So for large enough natural number k, pi((x \ k) ∪ s) = pi(x ∪ s). By the
definition of es, es(x) = pi(s ∪ x) ∈ {0, 1}. But es(x) = 2 since x ∈ [σs]ω. This is a
contradiction.
This claim tells us that for each individual s, pi satisfies the requirement(∗) on
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some subspace [σs]
ω. Then we can use a diagonalization to construct a real σ∗ such
that the map pi/(∅, σ∗) satisfies the requirement(∗) uniformly for all s ∈ [ω]<ω.
Let < si| i ∈ ω > be an enumeration of [ω]<ω. For i = 0, let σs0 be a homogeneous
set for es0 , and f(s0) be the constant value of es0 on [σs0 ]
ω. By Claim 3.2.1, f(s0) ∈
{0, 1}.
For i > 0, suppose σsk and f(sk) are defined for all 0 < k ≤ i, such that esk is the
constant f(sk) on [σsk ]
ω and σsk ⊆ σsk−1 . Since esi+1/(∅, σsi) is an invariant map as
esi+1 is, there is some σi+1 ⊆ σi such that esi+1 is constant on [σi+1]ω. Let f(si+1) be
this constant. Then by Claim 3.2.1, f(si+1) ∈ {0, 1}.
By induction on i, we get two sequences < σsi| i ∈ ω > and < f(si)| i ∈ ω >,
such that for all i ∈ ω, σsi+1 ⊆ σsi and esi is the constant f(si) on [σsi ]ω.
Now define a new real σ by σ(i) = σsi(i) for all i ∈ ω. Then for all i ∈ ω, σ \σsi is
finite since < σsi | i ∈ ω > is a ⊆ −descending chain. So fix some i ∈ ω and x ∈ [σ]ω,
then there is some large k ∈ ω such that x \ k ⊆ σsi . Then esi(x) = esi(x \ k) since
esi is invariant. Moreover, esi(x \ k) = f(si) since esi is the constant f(si) on [σsi ]ω.
So esi(x) = esi(x \ k) = f(si). Therefore, esi is the constant f(si) on [σ]ω.
Fix σ and f onwards.
Now f is a function from [ω]<ω to {0, 1}, and es [σ]ω is the constant f(s) for all
s ∈ [ω]ω. Apply Theorem 3.1.1(a) to pi/(∅, σ). There is some σ∗ ∈ [σ]ω, such that
∀y ∈ [σ∗]ω(y ∼ σ∗ ⇒ pi(y) = pi(σ∗)).
Without loss of generality, we assume that pi(σ∗) = 0. Now we check that the
map pi/(∅, σ∗) satisfies the requirement(∗).
For any s ∈ [σ∗]<ω and for any k ∈ ω, (σ∗ \ k) ∪ s ∈ [σ∗]ω and (σ∗ \ k) ∪ s ∼ σ∗.
Hence pi((σ∗ \k)∪ s) = 0 by the choice of σ∗. Then by the definition of es, es(σ∗) = 0
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for all s ∈ [σ∗]<ω. Since es is the constant f(s) on [σ∗]ω for all s ∈ [ω]<ω, f(s) = 0 for
all s ∈ [σ∗]<ω. Therefore, for all s ∈ [σ∗]<ω and for all x ∈ [σ∗]ω, es(x) = 0. Then by
the definition of es, the set {k ∈ ω| pi((x \ k) ∪ s) = 0} is cofinite for all s ∈ [σ∗]<ω
and for all x ∈ [σ∗]ω.
Let pi∗ be pi/(∅, σ∗). Then for all s ∈ [ω]<ω and for all x ∈ [ω]ω, the set {k ∈
ω| pi∗((x\k)∪ s) = 0} is cofinite. In other words, this pi∗ satisfies the requirement(∗).
Hence by Theorem 3.1.1(b), in every subspace [H]ω, there is some real such that
its equivalence class of ∼ is included by (pi∗)−1”{0}, the preimage of {0} under pi∗.
Informally speaking, the collection of reals whose equivalence classes are included by




0 if ∀y ∈ [ω]ω(y ∼ x⇒ pi∗(y) = 0);
1 otherwise.
Actually h is a test for a real whether its equivalence class is included by (pi∗)−1”{0}
or not. Then it is reasonable to predict that h(x) = 0 for a large set of x. Moreover,
this h is invariant. So there is a homogeneous set τ for h.
Claim 3.2.2. h [τ ]ω is the constant 0.
Proof. Suppose h [τ ]ω is the constant 1. Then by applying Theorem 3.1.1(b) to pi∗
and τ . Then there is some x ∈ [τ ]ω such that ∀y ∼ x, pi∗(y) = 0. So h(x) = 0 by the
definition of h. But h(x) = 1 since x ∈ [τ ]ω. This is a contradiction.
From this claim, pi∗ is the constant 0 on [τ ]ω. Hence pi∗ is Ramsey. So pi is Ramsey.
In summary, we have proved the following:
Theorem 3.2.3. (ZF+AD+DC) Suppose every invariant set of reals is Ramsey.
Then every set of reals is Ramsey.
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In the proof of this theorem, many consequences of AD have been used. So one
possible avenue of future work is how to get rid of the determinacy.
Question:
Assume ZF +DC. Is every set of reals Ramsey assuming every invariant set of reals
is Ramsey?
Now the only thing left for the ultimate open problem is how to prove every
invariant set is Ramsey in the context of AD. One possible way is to prove every





In this chapter, we introduce the Wadge game, which was invented by Wadge [23].
This game induces a relation on sets of reals. Moreover, this relation was shown to
be a wellorder, and this order is named after Wadge.
Since the Wadge order is a wellorder, it is natural to investigate how to construct
a set with some certain rank from sets with smaller ranks. Wadge [23] did a lot of
analysis about this for several types of ranks.
It is possible to prove that every invariant set is Ramsey by induction on the
Wadge rank since it is a wellorder. And Wadge’s results are sufficient to prove some
induction steps.
4.1 Wadge Order
Let A and B be two sets of reals. The Wadge game G(A,B) for this pair (A,B) is
defined as follows. Suppose in the k−th round, player I plays a natural number nk
while player II plays a natural number mk, such that < nk| k ∈ ω > and < mk| k ∈
ω > are two reals. Then player II wins if and only if (< nk| k ∈ ω >∈ A⇔< mk| k ∈
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ω >∈ B).
We say A is Wadge reducible to B (A ≤l B) if player II has a winning strategy in
the Wadge game G(A,B). A and B are Wadge equivalent (A ≡l B) if A ≤l B and
B ≤l A.
There is an alternative way to define the Wadge reducibility by Lipschitz functions.
Definition 4.1.1. A function f from [ω]ω into [ω]ω is Lipschitz if ∀x, y ∈ [ω]ω (x n=
y n⇒ f(x) n= f(y) n)). Then for two sets of reals A and B, A is Wagde reducible
to B if there is a Lipschitz function f such that ∀x ∈ [ω]ω (x ∈ A⇔ f(x) ∈ B).
Generally, this Wadge reducibility (≤l) may not be a linear order. Nevertheless,
any two sets of reals are linked by the Wadge reducibility.
Lemma 4.1.1 (Wadge). Assume ZF +DC + AD. For any two sets of reals A and
B, either A ≤l B or B ≤l Ac.
This lemma is named as Wadge lemma. In fact, the Wadge reducibility can be
modified to be a wellorder.
Definition 4.1.2. For two sets of reals A and B, let A ≤∗l B if A ≤l B or A ≤l Bc.
Hence A <∗l B if A ≤∗l B and ¬(B ≤∗l A). The relation ≤∗l is called the Wadge order.
Wadge lemma immediately implies that ≤∗l is a linear order.
Theorem 4.1.2 (Martin). Assume ZF +DC +AD. Then ≤∗l is a wellorder on sets
of reals.
For a set of reals A, let o(A) be the rank of A in the Wadge order. Namely, o(A)
is the order type of ({B| B <∗l A},≤∗l ). This order is a measure of the complexity of
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sets. The sets with rank 0 are the empty set and the whole set, which are simplest.
Sets with higher ranks are more complex. Wadge [23] prove that sets with some types
of ranks can be simply constructed from sets with smaller ranks.
Recall the ordinal Θ = sup{α ∈ Ord| there is a surjection from ωω to α}. Then
it is easy to prove that Θ is actually the length of the Wadge order.
Recall that As is the set {x ∈ [ω]ω| sˆ x ∈ A} for A ⊆ [ω]ω and s ∈ [ω]<ω.
Definition 4.1.3. A set A is self-dual if A ≡l Ac.
Theorem 4.1.3 (Wadge). Assume ZF +DC + AD.
• If A is self-dual, then o(B) = o(A)+1 iff (∀n, B<n> ≤l A and ∃n, B<n> ≡l A);
• If A is not self-dual, then o(B) = o(A) + 1 iff (∀n, B<n> ≤l A ∨ B<n> ≤l Ac
and ∃n,m, B<n> ≡l A ∧B<m> ≡l Ac);
• If cf(o(A)) = ω, then o(A) = sup{o(A<n>)| n ∈ ω}.
The idea behind this theorem is natural. Since B is actually a coding of the
sequence < B<n>| n ∈ ω >, both A and Ac must be coded in this sequence.
The situation for limit ordinals with uncountable cofinality is different. Let α < Θ
be a limit ordinal with uncountable cofinality. Then we do not know how to explicitly
construct a set with the Wadge rank α from sets with smaller Wadge rank. However,
we can do this for some special ordinals. Let x + n be the real < x(i) + n| i ∈ ω >
for a real x and a natural number n.
Theorem 4.1.4 (Wadge). Assume ZF+DC+AD. Let α < Θ and A be a set of reals
with the Wadge rank α+ 1. Let A∗ be the set {< 0, 1, ..., n, n+ 2 > (ˆx+ (n+ 3))| n ∈
ω ∧ x ∈ A}. Then o(A∗) = α + ω1.
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A real y in A∗ means that first it starts with the trivial sequence < 0, 1, 2, ... >
to some n and then we use a gap < n, n + 2 > to code the information that the tail
part is a real in A. Here the notion (x+ (n+ 3)) is introduced to guarantee the whole
sequence is strictly increasing.
The idea behind this theorem is also simple. Let B be a set with rank α+ω1. Then
by Theorem 4.1.3, o(B) = o(B<n0>) for some n0. So o(B<n0>) = o(B<n0,n1>) for some
n1, and so forth. Finally there is a real x =< n0, n1, n2, ... > such that o(B) = o(Bs)
for every s ≺ x. Conversely, give a set A with rank α + 1, A∗ is the simplest set
with higher rank and satisfying the property that for some x, o(A∗) = o(A∗s) for every
s ≺ x. Here x is the real < 0, 1, 2, 3... >. Hence the rank of A∗ should be α + ω1.
Moreover, < 0, 1, 2, 3... > is the unique real x such that o(A∗) = o(A∗s) for every
s ≺ x.
4.2 Induction on the Wadge Rank
The motivation here is to prove that every invariant set is Ramsey by induction on
the Wadge rank. First, the sets of reals with the Wadge rank 0 are exactly the empty
set and the whole set, which are both invariant and Ramsey. Then by Corollary ??,
we only have to consider the induction steps for limit ordinals with uncountable
cofinality. By Theorem 4.1.4, we can prove the induction steps for limit ordinals in
the form of α + ω1.
For a set of reals D, let ED be the set {x ∈ [ω]ω| ∀s ≺ x,Ds ≡l D}. Then ED is
always a closed set and ED = EDc . Moreover, ED is not empty whenever o(D) is a
limit ordinal with an uncountable cofinality.
Let A be a set whose Wadge rank is a successor ordinal, then EA∗ is the singleton
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{< 0, 1, 2, ... >} by the discussion in the end of the previous section. So EA∗∩A∗ = ∅.
Lemma 4.2.1. Assume ZF + DC + AD. Let B be a set of reals with the Wadge
rank α + ω1 for some α < Θ. Then either EB ⊆ B or EB ∩B = ∅.
Proof. Let A be a set of reals with the Wadge rank α + 1. Then o(A∗) = o(B).
Case 1. B ≡l A∗.
Then in the Wadge game G(B,A∗), player II has some winning strategy τ . Let player
I play an arbitrary real y in EB, and player II give some real x by τ . We prove that
x ∈ EA∗ .
Suppose x 6∈ EA∗ . Then by the definition of EA∗ , there is some s ≺ x such that
¬(A∗s ≡l A∗). So A∗s <l A∗. Let t ≺ y be such that |t| = |s|. Then after t and
s are played, the Wadge game G(B,A∗) is reduced to the Wadge game G(Bt, A∗s).
Moreover, player II still has a winning strategy in the Wadge game G(Bt, A
∗
s). So
Bt ≤l A∗s. Since t ∈ EB, B ≡l Bt. So A∗ ≡l B ≡l Bt ≤l A∗s <l A∗. This is a
contradiction.
Since player II has a wining strategy in G(B,A∗), (y ∈ B) ⇔ (x ∈ A∗). Since
EA∗ ∩ A∗ = ∅, x cannot be in A∗. Hence y cannot be in B. So EB ∩B = ∅.
Case 2. B ≡l (A∗)c.
Then by an analogue argument to case 1, EB ⊆ B.
Lemma 4.2.2. Assume ZF + DC + AD. Let A be an invariant set of reals. Then
A ≡l As for every s ∈ [ω]<ω.
Proof. It is sufficient to construct a winning strategy for player II in the Wadge game
G(A,As) for an arbitrary s ∈ [ω]<ω.
The strategy of player II is constructed by induction. Let m = max(s). Suppose
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in the k−th round, player I plays ik. Then player II plays m + k + 1 if ik ≤ m + k
and copies ik otherwise.
Suppose ik > m + k for some k. Then player II copies player I’s play from this
k−th round on. Therefore, player II wins since A is invariant.
Suppose ik ≤ m+k for all k ∈ ω. Then there is some integer l such that ir+1 = ir+1
for all r > l. Moreover, the real given by player II is < m+ 1,m+ 2,m+ 3, ... >. So
the two reals are ∼ −equivalent. Hence player II wins since A is invariant.
Combining these lemmas, we have the following summary.
Theorem 4.2.3. Assume ZF + DC + AD. Let A in an invariant set. Then the
Wadge rank o(A) of A does not satisfy any of the following.
• o(A) is a successor ordinal;
• o(A) has cofinality ω;
• o(A) = α + ω1 for some ordinal α.
One may wonder how about the other cases. Let A be the set {x ∈ [ω]ω| |{n ∈
x| n odd}| = ω}. Then Wadge proved that o(A) = ω21.
Let α be an arbitrary limit ordinal with uncountable cofinality. The difficulty is
that there is no explicit method to construct a set with rank α from sets below, like
the construction of A∗. Let A be the collection of ordinals α < Θ such that α is not
a successor ordinal, cf(α) > ω and α is not in the form of β + ω1. To run induction
on such α’s, we may need this assumption.
Assumption*: For every α ∈ A, the pointclass ∆α = {A| o(A) < α} is not
closed under arbitrary wellordered unions.
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Then an invariant set A with Wadge rank in A can be written as a wellordered
union of invariant sets with strictly smaller Wadge ranks.
Let I be the collection of invariant sets A such that
∀H ∈ [ω]ω, [H]ω 6⊆ A.
Question: Assume ZF + DC + AD. Is I closed under arbitrary wellordered
unions?
So the work left is to answer this question and get rid of Assumption∗.
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